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TWO NOTES ON THE JURISPRUDENCE
OF PRIVACY
Mark Tushnet *
I. GRISWOLD
Justice Douglas's opinion for the Supreme Court in Griswold v.
Connecticut 1 is widely regarded among law professors as fatally
flawed.2 The Court may have reached the right result, the standard
argument goes, but should have rested the result on the idea of
unenumerated rights as suggested by Justice Goldberg3 or on the
deep traditions of the country as suggested by Justice Harlan,4
rather than on the spectral penumbras and emanations of specific
provisions of the Constitution on which Justice Douglas relied.s
I will attempt to rehabilitate the method of constitutional analysis Justice Douglas used. I believe that his opinion offers a defensible form of legal argument, though of course one may disagree with
the application of that method to the problem in Griswold. After
explaining why Justice Douglas's construct is a coherent one, I enumerate some objections to its application, and conclude with some
observations about the implications of my defense of Justice Douglas's construct.
A.

THE METHODOLOGY OF GRISWOLD

Griswold held unconstitutional a Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives.6 The central passage in Justice Douglas's opinion for the Court says that "specific guarantees in the Bill
• Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I would like to thank Anita
Allen, Tom Krattenmaker, and L. Michael Seidman for their comments on a draft of these
Notes.
I. 381 u.s. 479 (I 965).
2. See, e.g., Dixon, The "New" Substantive Due Process and the Democratic Ethic: A
Prolegomenon, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REv. 43, 84; Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Founeenth
Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REv. 981, 994 (1979) ("magical mystery tour").
3. 381 U.S. at 517-20 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
4. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
5. See Greely, A Footnote to "Penumbra" in Griswold v. Connecticut, 6 CONST.
COMM. 251 (I 989).
6. The defendants were convicted as accessories to a violation of the prohibition on
use, and the Court held that the validity of their convictions rested on the constitutionality of
the prohibition on use.
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of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance."? He listed the first,
third, fourth, and fifth amendments as guarantees with such
penumbras.
One might interpret this passage as referring to penumbral
rights that are essential to the point or purpose of the enumerated
rights. Thus, for example, we value the protections specifically provided in the fourth amendment because we believe that there are
activities in the house that deserve to be protected against unjustified intrusion, and those activities are rightly called private. s Yet,
although this approach to the problem posed by Griswold is plausible, it does not seem to capture the metaphor of penumbras; one
pursuing this analysis could use the metaphor of "foundations" or
the language of "purpose" to express the analysis.
The essential argument expressed by the metaphor of penumbras, I believe, is this: Each specific constitutional provision fully
protects matters within its domain. Yet, to assure that those matters actually received the full protection to which they are entitled,
it is necessary to protect matters outside the domain of the specific
amendments. Justice Douglas offered NAACP v. Alabama9 as an
example. There the Court held that it was unconstitutional to require that the membership lists of the NAACP be disclosed. On the
Court's analysis, disclosure would inhibit the free choice people
would otherwise make to join or not join the NAACP; to the extent
that the decision to join was inhibited, the effectiveness of association for speech would be diminished. As Justice Douglas interpreted the case, it did not hold that mere compulsory disclosure of
membership in the NAACP directly violated the free speech guarantee of the first amendment; rather, it held that the effective protection of the speech of the NAACP, which was within the domain
of the first amendment, required that compelled nondisclosure be
barred.JO
A similar analysis might be made of the other provisions Justice Douglas listed. For example, one might develop a law of the
7. 381 U.S. at 484.
8. Another example of this approach can be found in Justice Marshall's dissenting
opinion in San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973), which justified heightened scrutiny of classifications affecting basic education because education is important to the
proper exercise of the right to vote.
9. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
10. One might describe the holding in NAACP v. Alabama as creating a prophylactic
rule, protecting matters not themselves protected by the specific provision in order to assure
protection of matters that were so protected. The language of prophylactic rules is more
familiar to lawyers than that of "penumbras" and "emanations," though it may not differ in
substance, but plainly it could not have been used in Griswold.
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fourth amendment on the "onion" model: As searches intrude
more deeply on fundamental values, a larger probability of cause is
necessary to justify the intrusion.'' The fifth amendment law of
self-incrimination might be sensitive to the values embodied in various evidentiary privileges, so that the amendment would bar
spouses or children from being compelled to disclose what a defendant told them.12
On Justice Douglas's construct, then, each specific constitutional provision is surrounded by a penumbra, and matters that fall
within the penumbras receive protection in order to assure that the
specific provisions are fully enforced. Now, consider the following
image of the construct. (See Diagram.) Each provision fully pro-

PRIVACY

tects matters within the dark circles. The penumbras shade off
around each provision. The penumbras of various provisions may
II. The Court has rejected the "onion" model. See W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT§ 2.6(3) (1987). Compare Stanford v.
Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965) (invalidating search for books because of insufficient reason to
intrude). To the extent that Stanford adopts an analysis like that suggested in the text, it
could be criticized for "double counting": the first amendment itself provides the protection,
and heightening the amount of cause required to search under the fourth amendment because
a book is involved is improper.
12. Again, this is not the present state of the law.
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overlap--as when the penumbral protections of association overlap
the penumbral protections of the household under the "onion"
model of the fourth amendment and the penumbral protections of
spousal disclosures under the suggested model of the fifth amendment. The degree of protection available to matters within the area
of overlap is as substantial as the degree of protection available to
matters within the core domains of the specific constitutional
provisions.
That is Justice Douglas's construct. At least on the level of
metaphor, it seems to "work." What might be wrong with it?B
(1) There are no penumbras at all. Each constitutional provision protects only what it protects, and cases
like NAACP v. Alabama are justified as direct protection
of first amendment matters: Compelled disclosure of
membership in the NAACP itself violates the free speech
guarantees of the Constitution, period.t4
(2) The penumbral protections do not (significantly)
overlap. NAACP v. Alabama is indeed a case of penumbral protection, but it is penumbral protection of political
speech, with no connection to or overlap with any possible
penumbral protections the household under the "onion"
model of the fourth amendment.
(3) The overlap among the penumbral protections
does not cover enough territory to justify the holding in
Griswold.
(4) The overlap cannot fairly be described as protecting a domain of privacy in the sense of personal autonomy, as it has come to be defined by the Court in cases
purporting to apply the doctrine first articulated in
Griswold.
(5) Whatever doctrine emerges from Justice Douglas's construct, it cannot be a free-standing doctrine of privacy; under the construct, every application of the
doctrine must ultimately be tied to some set of specific
constitutional provisions.
It should be noted that Justice Douglas may have understood
13. I enumerate these objections essentially in the order of the threat they pose to Justice Douglas's construct, with the most threatening first. I will not state the prefatory phrase,
attached to each objection, "even if the preceding objections are rejected, there is the following problem."
14. See, e.g., Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 CoLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1421 (1974)
("When the Constitution sought to protect private rights it specified them; that it explicitly
protects some elements of privacy, but not others, suggests that it did not mean to protect
those not mentioned.")
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the force of these last two objections. In his concurring opinion in
the abortion cases Justice Douglas used his construct, as the Court
did not. Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court was unconcerned
about locating the protection of privacy in any specific constitutional provision. Justice Douglas, in contrast, again enumerated
specific constitutional provisions implicated in the "choice of life
style" that was affected by a woman's decision to bear or not bear a
child, and listed cases in which the Court had protected dimensions
of that choice in the course of dealing with specific constitutional
provisions. Is For Justice Douglas, then, the "choice of life style" is
within the penumbral overlap of those provisions.
I do not wish to address here the merits of these objections.I6
My aim is only to establish that Justice Douglas's construct is
hardly incoherent. Like any other technique of constitutional interpretation, the elements that make it up can be discussed rationally
in the terms lawyers usually employ in constitutional discussions.
It is difficult to distinguish, I believe, from the law of free speech in
this regard.
What, however, is the significance of this explication of Justice
Douglas's construct in Griswold? The Bark nomination hearings
appear to have established that the Court decided Griswold correctly because it got the right answer, and may have established
that, at least in a case now understood by all to involve "an uncommonly silly law,"I7 all that matters is getting the right answer.
Even if the Court's rationale in Griswold is no longer important, Is
explaining why Justice Douglas's construct makes sense may be
useful. The criticisms of the construct may have led lawyers to
overlook the possibility of invoking the construct in other cases, and
it is always useful to add another argumentative technique to the
lawyer's armamentarium.
More important, Justice Douglas's construct is purely textualist; that is, it pays close attention to the language of the Constitution
and to the relations among its specific provisions. 19 Textualism is
15. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 201, 211-14 (Douglas, J., concurring).
16. I find the last objection the most interesting. The development of a free-standing
doctrine of privacy may exemplify a general process of constitutional development. A result
justified according to one approach to constitutional analysis not infrequently comes to take
on a life of its own, generating new results by the usual processes of analogy and re-rationalization that lawyers always employ, to the point where the courts are invoking the original
case to justify outcomes not at all close to that case's facts or rationale.
17. 381 U.S. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
18. Either because what matters is that the Court got it right or because the case has
now generated a free-standing doctrine of privacy.
19. See a/so C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1969).
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ordinarily regarded as the most confining technique of constitutional interpretation, the one that places the most severe limits on a
judge's ability to enact personal preferences into constitutional law.
Justice Douglas's construct shows that this common perception is
erroneous. A talented textualist judge has as much freedom as a
talented nontextualist, whether the nontextualist is an originalist, an
ethicist, or a process theorist.2o
The Court's decision in Griswold is often taken to be a watershed in the development of modem constitutional theory, because it
appears to have licensed the Court to engage in a variety of substantive innovations. I suggest that it is a watershed in another way. By
showing that the purportedly most confining technique of constitutional interpretation can be turned to quite unexpected ends, Justice
Douglas's opinion in Griswold supports the argument that controversies over methods of constitutional interpretation are unlikely to
yield fruitful results of any sort.

II. ROE
Many discussions of the abortion issue take the distinction between viability and non-viability to be important.21 Yet, the coherence of that distinction is rarely examined. When it is, we find that
the distinction itself leads directly to the basic questions about the
morality of abortion.
One of the fundamental components of the Roe test is viability.
Yet on close examination, this concept is highly problematic. Consider a full-term baby five minutes after it emerges from its mother's
womb. First, is the concept of viability relevant to such a child at
all? In ordinary use, we sometimes say that a plan is "not viable,"
meaning that it is foreseeably doomed to failure. A person in a persistent vegetative state who has been maintained solely by mechanical means is often said to be "not viable" from the moment the
20. Perhaps, precisely because Justice Douglas's opinion seems so wide-ranging, it
ought not count as textualist, where "textualism" is defined as a technique of constitutional
interpretation whose attention to text rules out the kind of analysis in which Justice Douglas
engaged. Yet, that would incorporate into the definition of textualism a substantive limitation on what counts as textualism, whose purpose is to constrain judicial activity in ways that
the remainder of the definition cannot. One might as easily resolve problems about the scope
of originalism, representation-reinforcement, or ethical analysis by incorporating similar substantive restrictions into those approaches to constitutional interpretation.
21. See, e.g., Wertheimer, Understanding the Abortion Argument, I PHIL. & Pus. AFF.
66, 78-85 (1974) (outlining the position). Other discussions take viability to be irrelevant to
the issue of abortion, which, on these views, may involve questions about the proper scope of
government action, womens' rights to control their bodies or to participate in society as full
citizens, or protecting actual or potential human life. I consider here only problems associated with claims that viability is relevant to the abortion issue.
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machines are turned off.22 An anencephalic baby is "not viable"
either, in ordinary terms. So the concept of viability is not confined
to fetuses in the womb.
What does it mean to say that a full term, normal baby is "viable"? Of course we can't mean that the baby will live out a "normal" lifespan, for at this point we have no reason to be confident of
that judgment. Nor can we mean that the baby can live "on its
own," because it obviously can't; it needs all sorts of support from
other people-food, shelter, and the like. According to the
Supreme Court, viability is the point at which the fetus is "potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial
aid. "23 This formulation implicitly distinguishes between artificial
aid and natural assistance like the provision of food and shelter,
although the sense in which the latter is natural is, as I will argue,
obscure. Yet, the baby's lifespan, and more important, its ability to
live on its own, do point us in the right direction, although the
Court's conjoining potentiality with the necessity for artificial aid
may mislead.
Suppose that the baby is born with characteristics that make it
certain that it will not survive for more than two days. Is the baby
viable? What about two years? I am inclined to think that, for
most people, the first baby-perhaps anencephalic-is not viable
and the second-perhaps one with Tay-Sachs disease-is viable. If
so, there appears to be some threshold for viability such that the
baby must live long enough to acquire the characteristics of personhood or at least a morally worthwhile lifespan. Concepts of personhood typically include the ability to generate specific affectional
ties with other people, the ability to apprehend the environment,
and perhaps more; concepts of a morally worthwhile lifespan might
be less stringent.24 But for present purposes, the crucial point is
that viability must be defined with reference to some normative concepts-of personhood or of a morally worthwhile lifespan.2s
22. Such a person is viable before the machines are turned off largely, I believe, because
he or she has previously attained the nonnative status of personhood that is the relevant
consideration in discussions of viability. What makes the question of "pulling the plug" difficult is the problematic status of someone who once was a person but will never be a person
again. Because the "nonviable" fetus has never been a person, the issues implicated in consideration of abortion differ from those implicated in discussions of termination of mechanical
means of life support.
23. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973).
24. For a discussion of these characteristics, seeM. TOOLEY, ABORTION AND INFANTICIDE (1984).
25. One formulation, based on standard reporting practices as of 1979, is that viability
is "the ability of the infant, afforded the best available medical care, to ... live beyond 28
days." Stubblefield, Late Abortion and Technological Advances in Fetal Viability: Some Medical Considerations, 17 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 161 (1985).

82

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 8:75

Now suppose that we have no reason to believe that the baby's
lifespan will be below the threshold. That in itself is sufficient, I
believe, to make the baby viable. Thus, in the ordinary case, this
criterion converges with another: viability is also defined by the fact
that we have no reason to believe that the baby's lifespan will be
shorter than that typical of other full-tenn babies.
Consider next a baby delivered prematurely. Is it viable if
(a) we have no reason to believe that its lifespan will be below the
threshold of personhood or a morally worthwhile lifespan? Or is it
necessary in addition that (b) we have no reason to believe that its
lifespan will be shorter than that typical of babies delivered at full
tenn, or (b') we have no reason to believe that its lifespan will be
shorter than that typical of other babies delivered-or aborted
spontaneously-at that premature stage? If (a) is sufficient, we are
left only with the question of defining the threshold. If, however,
(b) or (b') is needed as well, we face different questions. In particular, if (b) is necessary, fewer premature babies will be viable.
In addition, the lifespan typical of a full-tenn baby, and that
typical of babies delivered prematurely at various points, depends
on characteristics of the baby's society. Consider a baby born,
either at tenn or earlier, with characteristics that give us reasons to
believe that it will not survive long enough to cross the threshold of
personhood or of a morally worthwhile lifespan.26 The widespread
availability of infant intensive care units would offset those reasons,
thereby making the baby "viable" in the sense that, all things considered, we no longer have reasons to believe that it will not cross
the threshold. As Roger Wertheimer puts it, "the viability of a fetus is its capacity to survive outside the mother, and that is totally
relative to the available medical technology."27 As I will argue,
however, Wertheimer's statement that viability is "totally" relative
to technology is an overstatement, at least if it is taken to mean that
viability is solely relative to technology .2s For, I argue, viability is
also relative to the laws a society has in place.29
We are now in a position to consider the question of viability
26. The conclusions drawn in the text hold, of course, as to babies delivered before term
as well.
27. Wertheimer, supra note 6, at 82.
28. The reduction of viability to a technological issue is quite common. See, e.g.,
Rhoden, Trimesters and Technology: Revamping Roe v. Wade, 95 YALE L.J. 639, 657 (I 986)
("[v]iability is merely a medical or technological fact (or, more accurately, a statistical prediction).") This and similar formulations overlook the impact that the predictive element in the
definition of viability necessarily adds a social dimension to the medical and technological
elements.
29. As well as the resources the society chooses to devote to "the best available medical
care," in Stubblefield's formulation, supra note 25.
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with respect to abortion. If one believes that a fetus is a normative
person from the moment of conception or from some point prior to
the act of abortion, viability is irrelevant. Many people believe,
however, that viability has something to do with the issue. Consider, then, a society which has decided to devote enormous resources to the preservation of fetuses removed from wombs.3o Some
such fetuses will survive long enough to cross the threshold, though
perhaps not long enough to have a lifespan typical of babies born at
term (condition [b] above). In that society, more fetuses will be
viable than in one that devotes essentially no resources to the preservation of fetuses removed from the womb.
Now, this observation has two consequences. First, it makes it
clear that using the line of viability to distinguish the time when
abortion is permitted from the time after viability when it is prohibited (as Roe v. Wade does), is entirely perverse.3t Precisely because
the removed fetus is viable, it can survive past the threshold and
have a significant life, so the abortion is less objectionable.
Perhaps the implicit point is that more than the threshold is
required; by removing the fetus from the womb "prematurely," we
make it less likely that the child will have a life span typical of that
of children born at term. The "viability" distinction makes sense as
it is used in the abortion context, then, only if something like condition (b) is part of the definition of viability. Yet, that condition is
implausible, for it would make many premature babies not viable in
the sense that at the moment of their birth their chances for having
a lifespan typical of babies born at term are small, and grow smaller
the more premature they are.
Second, assume that fetuses are not persons prior to the time of
abortion. Then their viability depends on the surrounding social
structure: the availability of infant intensive care units, but also the
availability of programs for the promotion of the health of pregnant
women. One decisive element in that social structure is, of course,
the set of laws regulating abortion in the society. If abortions are
relatively widely available under the society's laws, fetuses that are
aborted are by definition not viable; that society's social structure is
what gives us reason to believe that fetuses removed from the womb
will not survive long enough to cross the threshold of personhood.
This conclusion cannot be defeated by suggesting that a soci30. For present purposes. I assume that these resources can be devoted to forms of
extrauterine development that are at present unavailable. Thus, I am assuming "plastic
wombs" or something of the kind.
31. See Tushnet & Seidman, A Note on Tooley's Abortion and Infanticide, 96 ETHICS
350 (1986).
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ety's laws, or its laws relating directly to abortion, should be excluded from consideration in determining whether an infant is
viable. For, the availability of infant intensive care units, for example, depends rather directly on the way in which a society structures
its legal system-the provision of tax benefits for certain kinds of
hospitals, the dimensions of tort liability, and the like. And, as to
the laws relating to abortion, consider a statute that requires physicians to do the most they can, within the limits of available technology, to "preserve" the life of potentially viable fetuses removed
from wombs during abortions. The term "potentially" is essential
to the coherence of such a statute, and it shows that the viability of
fetuses depends on the laws relating to abortion; in a state with such
a statute, more fetuses are viable than in a state without one, because more fetuses will live long enough to cross the threshold of
personhood.
In short, the concept of viability cannot be used as it has been
in discussions of abortion, to distinguish sharply between times
when abortion is permissible and times when it is not.32 It is, at
most, a term that defines which abortions a society chooses to permit or prohibit.
What might account for the attraction the idea of viability has
in discussions of abortion? One clue is provided by the statement by
the West German Constitutional Court in its Abortion Case: "The
developmental process ... is a continuous one which manifests no
sharp demarcation and does not permit any precise delimitation of
the various developmental stages of the human life. Nor does it end
with birth; for instance, the phenomena of consciousness specific to
human personality do not appear until some time after birth."33 I
believe that people attracted to using viability in discussions of
abortion share something like this view. Yet, if they do, they are
likely to be quite nervous about their commitment to the permissibility of abortions under some circumstances. They will find themselves unable to draw a logically defensible line anywhere in the
developmental process, with the effect that everyone might be vulnerable to the termination of life-pre-viability fetuses, post-viabil32. The argument is not that, because viability is necessarily defined with reference to
technology, a constitutional rule predicated to some extent on viability is unstable; the argument is, rather, that because viability is necessarily defined with reference to the entire social
setting in which gestation, childbirth, and abortion occurs-including laws regulating the
availability of abortion-a constitutional rule predicated to some extent on viability is
incoherent.
33. Quoted from D. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE fEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 350 (1989). See a/so Engelhardt, Viability, Abortion, and the
Difference Between a Fetus and an Infant, 116 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 429, 43031 (1973) ("Human life is an unbroken continuum extending from one person to another.")
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ity fetuses, new-born infants, people in persistent vegetative states,
and so on indefinitely. Although they recognize that they cannot
draw a logically defensible line at any particular point in this continuum of development, they believe that positions at the extremes
are clearly distinguishable. Philosophers call this the "sorites"
problem: We know the difference between a bald person and one
with a full head of hair though we cannot say at what point a person
"becomes" bald; we know the difference between a beach and a
patch of sand though we cannot say which grain of sand transforms
the patch into a beach. Identifying the point of transition is not a
matter of logic but of social convention.
Similarly, people who believe that the developmental process is
continuous, and who nonetheless believe that abortions ought to be
permitted under some circumstances, require a social convention
that will preserve the rights of those who they agree are uncontroversially "persons." As Nancy Rhoden put it, viability has
"symbolic import." For Rhoden, the importance was that the term
stood for "that time after which a fetus is so fully developed that it
looks like a baby and evokes the emotional and social responses that
babies evoke."34 It should be apparent that in this formulation the
conjunction of appearance and emotion is purely accidental, and
that the symbolic function would be served by whatever time came
to identify the point at which the emotional responses were evoked.
In the recent past viability has served as that convention, though of
course any other point would do: quickening, implantation, birth,
or even "the point at which a woman considering abortion has had
a fair opportunity to obtain one." It would take a different sort of
analysis-sociological and not philosophical-to identify why certain communities select one logically arbitrary convention while
others select another.35
One might even say that "viability" identifies a point in the
penumbra of the right to life.

34. Rhoden, Late Abortion and Technological Advances in Fetal Viability: Some Legal
Considerations, 17 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 160 (1985). Rhoden, supra note 28, at 672-73, recognizes the point in distinguishing between "Viability,," the technological version, and "Viability," the social/ethical one.
35. For one possible analysis, see Engelhardt, supra note 33, at 432 (relying on emergence of "a social structure" of mother-child relation, with certain psychological components, to explain why line might be drawn at point of birth, as distinguished from "primarily
biological" interactions between mother and fetus, which "occurs automatically and without
active involvement of the mother").

